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ABSTRACT

Managing intellectual property in a manner that achieves its full value is a priority
for companies of all types and sizes. Rather than viewing defensive publications as
strictly an alternative to patenting, it should be seen as an efficient complement to be
utilized in combination with patenting. The development of minor improvements on
major inventions presents an attractive situation for combining strategic disclosure
with traditional patent protection.
Publishing information about a minor
improvement will create prior art and prevent competitors from obtaining a patent.
By publishing incremental innovations to core patents, a firm can achieve the initial
patent protection necessary to create a market advantage, and then protect that
advantage through publication without enduring the costs of patenting small
improvements. The major invention will be protected under patent, while the
subsequent publications will protect the core patent by preventing others from
patenting an improvement. Adopting this strategy avoids the prohibitive costs of
blanket-patenting, and maximizes the value of intellectual property assets for
companies both large and small.
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"Ifyou'resmart,you won't spend the moneypatentingall the incremental
innovations."I

INTRODUCTION

For companies of all types and sizes, intellectual property is an increasingly
important asset. 2 Managing intellectual property in a manner that achieves its full
value is a priority for these companies. 3 Thus, proactive steps must be taken to
protect innovative technology that has been developed or is in the development
process. 4 Recovering the significant costs of research and development is usually
possible only in the presence of a market advantage. 5 The development of new
technology creates the necessary market advantage, and it must be maintained and
exploited. 6 A highly effective strategy involves the use of defensive publishing 7 in a
role differing from the traditional approach.
Rather than viewing defensive
publication as strictly an alternative to patenting, it should be seen as an efficient
complement to be utilized in combination with patenting. When defensive publishing
is combined with strategic patenting, major innovations and minor improvements
8
can be protected in an extremely efficient manner.
* J.D. Candidate I.P., June 2004, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. Bachelor of
Science in Mechanical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, 2001.
1 Peter Buxbaum, Publish orPerish,THE BRIDGE, at 5 (2001), availableat http://www.ipcapital
group.com/corporate/the bridge/bridgecomplete.pdf (quoting John Cronin, CEO of ipCapital Group).
As a consultancy, ipCapital Group advises companies on defensive publishing and other intellectual
property strategies. Id.
2
Sarah Milstein, Property Values, THE BRIDGE,
at 9
(2001), availale at
http://www.ipcapitalgroup.com/
corporate/the-bridge/bridgecomplete.pdf
[hereinafter
Property
Values].
3
Michael Winkleman, The IP On Ramp, THE BRIDGE, at 1 (2001), available at
http://www.ipcapital group.com/corporate/the bridge/bridgecomplete.pdf (commenting on the pace of
innovation and the increasing importance of intellectual property).
4 Nicola Burns, Using Technology as a Competitive Weapon, TITE AND LEWIS, at http://
www.titeandlewis.com/articles/article62277final.pdf (November 22, 2001) (providing a brief overview
of patent protection and technology as a competitive weapon).

5id.
6 Id. Through a limited monopoly, patents on new technology can protect "leading products
and provide high margins." Id. Alternatively, defensive publishing can prevent a competitor from
obtaining a patent for an invention, although the revenue stream will be limited. Td.
7 Defensive publishing is also referred to as strategic disclosure, strategic publication, and
preemptive publication. Compare Lichtman, infra note 27, with Parchomovsky, infra note 29, and
Buxbaum, supra note 1 (discussing the use of prior art as a means for blocking competitors' patents,
but employing different terms).
In the context of this comment, the terms will be used
interchangeably.
8 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing comments by David Kline, co-author of Rembrandts
in the Attic.*Unlocking the Hidden Value ofPatents).
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The development of minor improvements on major inventions presents an
attractive situation for combining strategic disclosure with traditional patent
protection. Major inventions should be patented to protect the market advantage
opportunity they create. 9
Defensively publishing subsequent incremental
innovations on the major invention will provide protection from competitors without
the costs of conventional blanket patenting. 10 By publishing information about the
innovation, prior art is created that will prevent competitors from obtaining a
patent.1 1 Thus, the combination of patenting and defensive publication provides
efficient protection.
This comment discusses defensive publishing as a complement to traditional
patent protection. Part I reviews the patent law upon which defensive publishing
operates. Part II analyzes the opportunities in which defensive publishing may be
useful. Part II(A) specifically addresses the role of laggards in a patent race, while
Part 11(B) addresses the position of a leader. Part III proposes that strategic
disclosure should be seen not as an alternative, but rather as a complement to
patenting, given the proper situation. Part 111(A) notes the difficulties encountered
in using defensive publishing as an alternative to patent protection. Part 111(B)
proposes using defensive publishing as a complement to patent protection in the
narrow situation of a minor improvement on a core patent already held by the
company. Overall, strategic disclosure of small, incremental innovations, can allow a
company to quickly protect the innovations and preserve the value of a core patent,
without the prohibitive costs associated with patent protection.

I. STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE UTILIZES TRADITIONAL PATENT LAW

Strategic disclosure operates under the same laws on which traditional patent
protection is based. Part 1(A) reviews the basics of patents, and the policies
motivating the patent system. Part I(B) discusses blanket patenting, as opposed to
defensive publishing. Part I(C) constructs the legal framework making defensive
publishing possible, while Part I(D) briefly discusses the requirements for a
defensive publication to act as prior art.

A. PatentBasics andPolicy
Patents 12 are one of the most important forms of protection available for
innovative technology. 13 A patent is a government issued grant of the right to

9 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. "A typical monopoly market exists because there is
some barrier to market entry by potential competitors." DONALD S. CHISUIM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW, 60 (2d ed. 2001). "Such barriers to entry may be physical . . . or the patent grant of
the right to exclude." Id.
10 See infra Part I(B).
11 Richard Poynder, On The Defensive About Invention, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 19, 2001),
available at http://www.search.ft.com (subscription required).
12 "Patent" is derived from "letters patent," which were letters addressed by a sovereign
granting a privilege to the patentee. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
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exclude others from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States...
"14
Patentable subject matter includes processes, 15 machines, objects of
manufacture, and compositions of matter. 16 The right to exclude others granted by a
17
patent is generally a period of twenty years from the patent application filing date.
Patents represent an attempt to balance promoting innovation by rewarding an
inventor, and placing new knowledge into the public domain.18 By offering an
exclusive right, a patent induces investment, invention, and disclosure.1 9 In return
for the right to exclude others, an inventor must describe his invention in sufficient

13 Casey P. August & Michael J. Buchenhorner, Strategies For Developing Intellectual
Property Portfolios In The Global Environment: Protection Of Intellectual Property In Hostile
Environments, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 262 (1995).
14 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process,
of the right to exclude others from using , offering for sale or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
Id.
15 "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000).
1635 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. In the United States,
plant and design patents are also obtainable. Id. at § 161 ("Whoever invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants,
hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuberpropogated plant or a plant found in an
uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor .. ");Id. at § 171 ("Whoever invents any new,
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor . .
1735 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the
date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States, or if
the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or
applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which
the earliest such application was filed.
Id. For patents filed before June 8, 1995, the term is seventeen years from the issue date of the
patent. Id. at § 154(c)(1) (1994). For patents filed after June 8, 1995, the term is twenty years from
the earliest claimed filing date. Id. "The average term for these more recent applications will
remain seventeen years because there is an average of three years between filing and issuance.
CHISUM ETAL., supranote 9, at 822 n.3.
1s CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 1. This policy is based on the consequentialist justification
"that a property right in one's intellectual creations is necessary as a means to a greater end". Id. at
5.
Patents are tolerated "as an incentive for the creation, disclosure, and dissemination of
technological advances." Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 1. A patent is a government attempt to "create a market for a good by establishing
new forms of property rights in things related to the good." Id. at 67. The government grants this
right to "[give an] inventor the freedom to disclose without fear of self-induced competition." Id. at
66. A potential financial reward arises from putting the patentee in a position to exclude others
unless they agree to licensing and similar settlements on the patentee's terms. Poynder, supra note
11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
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detail to give notice to the public and enable 20 a "person having ordinary skill in the
art ' 2 1 to make and use the invention. 22 Subject to a few exceptions, 23 a patent
application is published by the government eighteen months after filing, thus placing
24
the new knowledge the patent describes into the public domain.
One of the justifications of the patent system is the incentive to disclose. 25 By
encouraging the disclosure of inventions to the public, new knowledge is immediately
made available to the public and industrial growth is promoted. 26 In the case of
traditional patent protection, conventional wisdom dictates that the patent system
encourages disclosure by making it a requirement before patent protection is
awarded. 27 However, the patent system may encourage disclosure in a less obvious
way when firms are in competition for a new invention. 28 Firms can affect the
29
patentability of a competitor's invention by "altering the state of the prior art."
20 The enablement requirement is the quid pro quo of the United States patent system. See
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). "[It] serves to enrich the
storehouse of public knowledge, while on the other hand, it provides for a limitation on claim scope."
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 190.
21 This objective viewpoint refers to a hypothetical person who has ordinary skill in the art.
Life Tech., Inc. v. Clontech Lab., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The relevant art is that
to which the claimed invention pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). In determining an ordinary skill
level, the following factors are considered: "(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of
problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to the problems; (4) rapidity with which
innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active
workers in the field." Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
breadth of knowledge of the person of ordinary skill is presumed to be perfect, despite being
unrealistic. Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
CHISUM ET AL., supranote 9, at 598.
22 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 (2000).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
23 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2) (2000) (providing for exceptions to the regular 18 month publication
schedule in the case of abandonment, secrecy orders, and provisional and design patents).
24 CHISUM ETAL., supra note 9, at 3;35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
[E]ach application for a patent shall be published, in accordance with procedures
determined by the Director, promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months
from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under this title. At the
request of the applicant, an application may be published earlier than the end of
such 18-month period.
Id.
25 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 70.
26 Id. at 59, 72.
27 Douglas Lichtman et al., Symposium: Taking Stock.* The Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property Rights: Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2177 (2000).
The motivation of disclosure to preempt a competitor's patent is discussed from the positions of both
the leader and loser in a patent race. Id. The article concludes that strategic disclosure is not
motivated solely by the law, but also by the competitive interests and goals of firms reacting to each
other in a dynamic situation. Id.
28 Id.
29 Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000) (questioning the
traditional race model that has been utilized by economists and game theorists, and suggesting that
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Firms can achieve this with any publication because it immediately becomes prior
3 1
art.30 Such a practice is known as defensive publishing.

B. Blanket Patenting Versus Defensive Publishing
A common and traditional way to protect new technology and improvements
thereon is by patenting every new improvement. Using a strategy known as "blanket
patenting,"3 2 companies patent a new invention, and then file patents on minor
improvements made to the original invention. 33 This approach in protecting
intellectual property is simple and straightforward.
However, a less obvious
protection strategy requiring a higher level of planning may be suitable because of
34
the disadvantages of blanket-patenting.
One of the disadvantages in a blanket-patenting strategy is the possibility of
being "picket-fenced" by competitors. 35 Picket-fencing is a situation in which
competitors patent every incremental improvement on your patent, eroding its
value.3 6 Competitors can then license your technology on their own preferred
terms.3 7 For example, in 1982, IBM was granted a United States patent on the
scanning tunneling microscope ("STM").38 Initially, IBM dominated the field with its
STM, but only seven years later were picket-fenced by competitors patenting small
40
improvements. 39 As a result, they lost full control of their pioneering technology.
Another disadvantage of blanket-patenting is the prohibitive costs. 41

As the

costs of patent prosecution and patent litigation rise, many companies are beginning
to question the perceived value provided by a blanket patenting strategy.42 Filing a
domestic patent application can cost $15,000. 4 3 Filing in multiple jurisdictions will

cost a minimum of $50,000, and maintaining the patents during their term is

a firm may have incentive to prevent a competitor from obtaining a patent rather than competing
with them head-on for the patent by strategic disclosure).
30 Id.
31 Poynder, supra note 11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
32 See id. Blanket-patenting is an approach to intellectual property where all improvements,
minor and major, are patented in an attempt to maintain complete control over a market created by
a company's invention. Id.
33 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5.
34
3'
36
37

Id.
Poynder, supra note 11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
Id.

Id.

Id. A scanning tunneling microscope (STM) is capable of imaging atomic details as small as
1/251 the diameter of a typical atom. Id.
38

39

Id.

40

Id.

41 Id. The costs of patenting involve more than just financial expenditure, but also significant

time and effort in just the patent prosecution stage. Id.
42 Id.

43 Sarah Milstein, New Economy,*Many Midsize Companies Find that Defensive Publis-hing'is
a Quick and Cheap Way to Protect Intellectual Property, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/searebadvanced/ (Feb. 18, 2002) (subscription required) [hereinafter New
Economy].

[2:398 2003]

Protecting Minor Improvements on Core Patents

expected to cost at least $100,000. 44 Additionally, just having the legal protection of
a patent is insufficient unless you can also afford to enforce the patent by litigating
an infringement action, which is notoriously expensive. 45 The perceived alternative
is to not patent, but this is risky because it allows a competitor to patent its own
version of a firm's invention. 46 In this situation, the competitor may demand
licensing fees before allowing the firm to use their own invention, or may even
prevent them entirely from participating in the market they created. 47 To avoid the
disadvantages of blanket-patenting, companies are adopting defensive publishing
48
strategies.
49
By publishing information about their invention, companies create "prior art"
that will prevent competitors from patenting the invention because it is no longer
novel after being made public.

50

This approach allows a company to maintain its

claim to an invention without filing a patent. 51 They maintain the freedom to use
their unpatented innovation, while also allowing everyone else to use it.52
Additionally, defensive publishing can function as a blocking tactic similar to
blanket-patenting, but at a significantly lower cost. 53 For example, publishing on an
easily accessible website, such as IP.com, costs $109, as opposed to the typical
$15,000 for prosecuting a patent. 54 Under patent laws, the publication has the effect
55
of altering the prior art, thus blocking competitors' attempts to patent.
Defensive publishing takes advantage of a principle upon which the patent
system is based. 56 A tradeoff of information in return for a grant of limited monopoly
drives the patent system. 57 Because a limited monopoly is a cost to society, 58 patents
44 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 2. A patent owner must pay maintenance fees to the Patent and
Trademark Office during the patent term. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000). The patent will expire if the
fees are not paid. Id. The fees are paid at three stages of the patent term: in the first six months of
(1) the fourth year after issuance ($830); (2) the eighth year after issuance ($1,900); and (3) the
twelfth year after issuance ($2,910). Id.
45Burns, supranote 4, at http://www.titeandlewis.com/articles/article62277final.pdf.
46Poynder, supra note 11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
47Id.
48 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 2. IBM has pursued a strategy of defensive publication for over
ten years. d. Their Tehohnin! Disclosure Bulletin is the single most cited source for prior art by the
Patent and Trademark Office. Id. IBM utilizes this publication source to direct its innovations into
the public domain, and prevent competitors from securing patents that would limit IBM's freedom in
the market. Id.
49 "Prior art" is used to broadly refer to previously known information. CHISUM ET AL., supra
note 9, at 93.
50Poynder, supra note 11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
51 Ruth Walker, Whose Idea Is It, Anyway THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, available at
http://www.cs monitorarchive.com (Jan. 17, 2002) (subscription required).
52 Id.
53 Poynder, supra note 11, at http://www.search.ft.com.
54 IP.com is a web-based disclosure service. Id. The Web site enables inventors to introduce
prior art by posting it on the site. Id. Publishing in this manner can be done for a fraction of the
cost of patenting, and with little paperwork.
Id.; New Economy, supra note 43, at
http://query.nytimes.com/search /advanced/.
55 Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 927.
56 Id. at 932.
57 Id.
o5 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 61. Monopolies "tend to create a market-wide inefficiency
called 'dead-weight-loss." Id. "The dead weight loss represents a collective loss of societal wealth,
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are granted only to new inventions. 59 Granting a patent to a previously known
invention defeats the purpose of the patent system.6 0 Additionally, even a novel
invention may still be unpatentable if it is obvious in light of the prior art.6 1 The
policy of the patent system dictates that an invention make a meaningful
62
contribution in terms of new knowledge, and is different from existing inventions.
This policy is embodied in the Patent Act 63 by the requirements of novelty and
64
nonobviousness, which provide the legal basis for defensive publishing.

C. Legal Basisfor Defensive Publishing
The strategy of defensive publishing ismade possible by legal rules prohibiting
patent protection unless an innovation is novel and nonobvious. 6 5 Novelty and
nonobviousness are both determined in light of the prior art.66 For this reason, firms
can affect the patentability of competitors' inventions by adding to the prior art
67
against which new inventions are evaluated.

i.e.,
wealth that is not merely shifted from consumers to producers but rather wealth that is
altogether lost from producers and consumers."
weight loss in a monopolist market).
F9Id.
(30Id.

Id. at 61-65 (explaining the creation of a dead

(31
Id. at 933.
62 Id.

133See generally35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
(34
Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 933.
6 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Correspondence. The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to
Create PriorArt. A Response to ProfessorParhomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358 (2000) (responding
to an article by Professor Gideon Parchomovsky, supra note 29, and arguing that publication of
research by a firm may evince more than a motivation to act in a spoiler role and preempt
competitors' patents).
(36Id. For obviousness determinations, the scope and content of the prior art is limited to that
which is analogous. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that "a person having
ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably have expected to solve the problem of dead volume in
tanks for storing refined petroleum by considering a reference dealing with plugging underground
formation anomalies").
Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1)
whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the filed of the inventor's
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.
Id.at 658-59. See also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that "although
there is little dispute that the prior art references cited here . . .are not within the same field of
endeavor as computers, such references may still be analogous if they are 'reasonably pertinent to
the particular problem with which the inventor is involved."').
(37
Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 927.
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1. Novelty
68
It
The novelty requirement is embodied in section 102(a) of the Patent Act.
denies patentability to inventions known by others in the United States, or described
in a printed publication in either the United States or a foreign country prior to the
date of invention by the patent applicant. 69 The novelty requirement focuses on the
patent applicant and asks if a third person previously disclosed or invented the
subject matter sought to be patented.70
Additionally, section 102(b) denies
patentability if the subject matter was disclosed more than one year prior to the
application filing date.7 1 Courts have interpreted the novelty requirement such that

patent applications will be rejected if "there existed a single prior art reference that
disclosed 'each and every element' of the claimed invention"' 2 so as to allow use of the
invention without undue experimentation by a person skilled in the art. 73 However,
the novelty requirement is not the most significant statutory provision in relation to
74
defensive publishing.
For a publication to preempt a subsequent patent application, an identical
disclosure of the claimed invention is not required. 75 Rather, the publication merely
76
has to make the claimed invention obvious in the eyes of a person skilled in the art.

2. Nonobviousness
77
It
The nonobvious requirement is embodied in section 103 of the Patent Act.
prevents patent protection from being granted to meaningless improvements on prior

68 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2180; see 35 U.S.C § 102(a) (2000) ([A person shall be entitled
to a patent] unless the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent ... ").
(3 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
70 See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
7135 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
[A person shall be entitled to a patent unless] the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States....
Id.
72In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A rejection for anticipation under
section 102 requires that each and every limitation of the claimed invention be disclosed in a single
prior art reference.").
73 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A
patent is invalid only when those skilled in the art are required to engage in undue experimentation
to practice the invention."); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28214, at *11-12
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The key to analyzing an 'undue experimentation' attack on the enablement of a
patent, and therefore of an anticipatory reference, is in determining what is 'undue'..."); Cf
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that in the
context of conception an idea must be "sufficiently precise that a skilled artisan could carry out the
invention without undue experimentation .
74Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2181.
75 Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 933.
76 Id.
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inventions.7 8 This requirement also promotes the policy of the patent system by
79
"limiting patentability to inventions that truly enhance social utility."'
Even without completing the invention, defensive publishing can be used under
this requirement to prevent a competitor from receiving a patent.8 0 By adding
information to the prior art, patentability may be affected.81 One new piece of
information can establish obviousness by combining it with other prior art
references.8 2 The only requirement to render the combination obvious is that a
83
reason or motivation for the combination exist in the prior art.
The use of defensive publishing under the nonobvious requirement is subject to
two limitations.8 4 First, the language of section 103(a) expressly provides that
nonobviousness is to be decided "at the time the invention was made."8 5 Under this
language, courts judge obviousness by looking at the prior art existing when the
invention was conceived, and one year prior to the application filing date.8 6 Patent
Office Rule 131 reflects this by allowing an inventor to "swear behind" and eliminate
a section 102(e) prior art reference.8 7 Under this rule, an inventor can show that he
88
conceived the invention prior to the reference's existence and worked diligently to
7735 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.

Id.
78Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 933.
7')Id. at 928; see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
"Practical utility' is a shorthand way of attributing
'real-world' value to claimed subject matter." Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
80 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2185.
81 Id.
82 Id.
8:3 Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1578-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[T]he record must provide a teaching, suggestion, or reason to substitute . . .[t]he absence of such
a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.").
81 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2185.
85 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
86 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2186.
87 37 C.F.R § 1.131(a) (1994).

When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected, the
inventor of the subject matter of the rejected claim, the owner of the patent under
reexamination, or the party qualified under §§ 1.42, 1.43, or 1.47, may submit an
appropriate oath or declaration to establish invention of the subject matter of the
rejected claim prior to the effective date of the reference or activity on which the
rejection is based. The effective date of a U.S. patent, U.S. patent application
publication, or international application publication under PCT Article 21(2) is
the earlier of its publication date or date that it is effective as a reference under
35 U.S.C. 102(e). Prior invention may not be established under this section in any
country other than the United States, a NAFTA country, or a WTO member
county....

Id.
88 Diligence is a factor only when a party is the first to conceive an invention, but second to
achieve actual or constructive reduction to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000). Because patent
law sets forth a policy of prompt disclosure, importance is placed on what the party was doing when
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reduce the invention to practice.8 9 However, this rule does not eliminate the
possibility of strategic disclosure under the statutory bars because it cannot remove
references whose effective date is more than one year before the application filing
date. 90 Furthermore, use of defensive publishing under the nonobvious requirement
is still possible because of the uncertainty inherent in conception. 91
It may be difficult to determine when exactly conception has occurred, and this
uncertainty leaves open the question of priority of an invention. 92 An invention is
conceived when the inventor has formed a "definite and permanent idea of the
complete and operative invention, as it is [thereafter] applied in practice." 93 "The
idea must be so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill would
be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or
experimentation." 94 Thus, inventors reacting to competitors' actions must prepare for
the fact that they may not have legally conceived their invention yet. 95 Additionally,
conception is a step occurring late in the inventive process, allowing an ample
96
window of opportunity prior to conception.
Defensive publishing is subject to a second limitation under the nonobvious
requirement resulting from a court's use of "secondary factors" as objective evidence
in measuring obviousness. 97 An intended defensive publication may interact with the
secondary factors "to make an invention look less obvious, not more."98 Objective
evidence of nonobviousness must be considered when present.99 The secondary
factors are favored over a hindsight reconstruction that is subject to significant
10 2
bias.100 The objective considerations include commercial success,10 1 long-felt need,
6
10
10
5
failure of others,10 3 copying,10 4 and licensing or acquiescence.
another party became the first to reduce to practice despite lagging behind at the point of
conception. CHISUM ET AL., supranote 9, at 510. The party first to conceive must show "reasonable
diligence" from just before the other party's conception till their own reduction to practice to
maintain a claim of priority. In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
inventor reduced conception to practice with requisite diligence).
89 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b) (1994).
The showing of facts shall be such, in character and weight, as to establish
reduction to practice prior to the effective date of the reference, or conception of
the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligenen

from prior to said date to a subsequent reduction to practice or to the filing of the
application. Original exhibits of drawings or records, or photocopies thereof, must
accompany

and

form

part of the

affidavit

or declaration

of their

absence

satisfactorily explained.

Id.
90 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a) ("Prior invention may not be established under this section ...

[if] (2)

The rejection is based upon a statutory bar.
). See infra Part I(C)(3).
91 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2186.
92 Id.
9:3Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
94 Id.
95 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2186-87.
96 Id. at 2187.
97 Id.
98 ITd.

9 Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See
also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
100 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (stating it was error for the District Court to employ the benefit of
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The failure of others is "virtually irrefutable" evidence of nonobviousness. 10 7
Under this factor, a defensive publication intended to bar patentability under section
103 may actually be evidence that a firm was competing for an invention but had
108
failed as of that publication.
Inventors often claim that a competitor copied their invention, and that the
copying is evidence of nonobviousness. 10 9 In combination with failure of others,
copying creates a difficult situation for a competing firm. 110
If they publish
information, but then fail to achieve the invention, that failure may be used as
evidence of nonobviousness. 111 But if the publishing firm just waits and copies a
hindsight); see Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 935 ("The hindsight bias is a cognitive effect that
causes people to 'exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight [and] to view [what has
happened] as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened."').
101 When commercial success is asserted as evidence of nonobviousness, the patentee
essentially says "[i]f my invention is obvious, why didn't any of my competitors have success making
the invention given its significant consumer demand?" CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 606. The
reasoning behind this argument is that competitors tried, but failed, which points to a conclusion of
nonobviousness. Id. Additionally, for commercial success to carry meaningful weight, a nexus must
be proven to exist between it and the benefits of the claimed invention. Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic
Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In other words, the commercial success must be
attributable to the claimed invention. Id. at 316 (concluding that it could not be said "that the
commercial success here may not have been due in large part to 'other economic and commercial
factors unrelated to the technical quality of the patented subject matter."' (citing Cable Elec. Prod.,
Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
102 A long-felt need in an industry when combined with the failure of others to satisfy that need
may be evidence of nonobviousness. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing a
Board of Appeals decision for improperly discounting evidence of a failure of others to provide a
feasible solution to a longstanding problem of lifting heavy loads by aircraft). Identifying a need is
accomplished from an objective viewpoint. Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1136, 1144
(Fed. Cir. 1986). This factor works in conjunction with the "failure of others" to lead to a conclusion
of nonobviousness. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1475 ('A review of the rebuttal evidence shows
that there was a failure of others to provide a feasible solution to the long-standing problem of lifting
very heavy loads ...").
103 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("T]ends to
show the nonobviousness of the claimed invention as does failure of others ...").
104 Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed.Cir. 1984) ("The copying of an
invention may constitute evidence that the invention is not an obvious one.").
1051The acceptance of a license by a competitor may be an implied recognition of
nonobviousness. See EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
reasoning stems from an assumption that a firm would not pay royalties unless it thought the
patent was valid, but this factor is susceptible to the business and economic decisions of the firm
also. Id. at 907-08.
Such programs are not infallible guides to patentability. They sometimes succeed
because they are mutually beneficial to the licensed group or because of business
judgments that it is cheaper to take licenses than to defend infringement suits, or
for other reasons unrelated to the unobviousness of the licensed subject matter.

Id.
106 See generallyGraham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (stating that
"as indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy").
107 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated on other

grounds, 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
108Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2188.
109 Vandenberg, 740 F.2d at 1567.
110 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2188.
111

Id.
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competitor's invention, the copying will be strong evidence of nonobviousness. 112
Copying is the strongest evidence of nonobviousness when used in this situation where the firm initially attempted the invention but failed. 113 The other secondary
factors operate in a similar manner, making strategic disclosure a difficult option
when trying to prevent patentability under the nonobvious requirement. 114 However,
statutory bars provide another opportunity for defensive publishing.

3. StatutoryBars
The "statutory bars" of section 102(b) of the Patent Act are also important in the
realm of defensive publishing. 115 This section requires a patent application to be filed
promptly by only granting a one-year grace period, thus giving rise to an opportunity
for strategic disclosure by a later inventor. 116 Between the first inventor's conception
and actual date of filing, a later inventor can disclose information that may bar
patenting. 117 Admittedly though, defensive publishing in this scenario will be
difficult because the first inventor is given one year from the time of the defensive
publication to file a patent application before it would be barred. 118 Thus, disclosure
under these circumstances would not bar, but rather encourage patenting by the first
inventor. 119
Defensive publishing may still be possible by utilizing "quiet disclosure." 120 For
example, a single disclosure in a foreign library may constitute prior art capable of
barring a patent application if the later inventor is unaware of its existence. 121 An
analogous form of quiet disclosure can be accomplished through the Statutory

H2 Id.
113 Vandenberg,740 F.2d at 1567. "This would be particularly true where the copyist had itself

attempted for a substantial length of time to design a similar device, and had failed." Id.

I'I Lichtman,

supra note 27, at 2188.
Id. at 2181.
11 fId. at 2181-82; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
117 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2182.
118 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
11) Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2184.
120 Id. "Quiet disclosure" occurs when a firm publishes in such a manner that the original
115

inventor will be unaware of the disclosure.

Id.

However, this situation raises further questions of

whether a patent examiner will find the disclosure, and if not, what must be further done to utilize
the disclosure as a preemption to patentability. Id. However, this issue is beyond the cursory
treatment of quiet disclosure in this comment.
121 See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the "argument that a single
catalogued thesis in [the Freiburg] [U]niversity library does not constitute sufficient accessibility to
those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence"); see also infra notes 132-34, 190.
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Invention Registration ("SIR") procedure. 122 The SIR is effective as prior art as of the
123
date filed.
Under the patent laws, defensive publications operate as prior art because of the
statutory requirements of novelty and nonobviousness, in addition to the statutory
bars providing a one-year grace period. 124 The patent laws also dictate the
requirements for a defensive publication to qualify as prior art.125

D. Legal Requirements of Defensive Publishing
The requirements for a disclosure to constitute a defensive publication are
similar to those determining the sufficiency of a patent application. 126 A defensive
publication must have an enabling disclosure to negate patentability. 127
A
publication is enabling if the information disclosed allows a person skilled in the art
to produce the invention. 128 Thus, a publication must describe the invention in detail
129
with sufficient clarity, rather than providing an obscure or suggestive description.
Unlike a patent application though, a defensive publication need not disclose a
utility for the invention. 130 The removal of the utility requirement makes defensive
publication possible even when no known use exists for the invention.131 However, a
subsequent inventor may still obtain a method patent when a use is discovered for
the invention. 132
122

35 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Director is authorized to
publish a statutory invention registration containing the specification and
drawings of a regularly filed application for a patent without examination if the
applicant...(1) meets the requirements of section 112 of this title...(3) waives the
right to receive a patent on the invention within such period as may be prescribed
by the Director....

Id.
123 See 35 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2000). For a discussion of SIRs, see Eisenberg, supra note 65, at
2365-69, which addresses the use of SIRs in DNA sequencing races.
124 See generally35 U.S.C. § 102-103 (2000).
125

Soo 35 U.S.C. § 102-103 (2000).

35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000) (requiring that an SIR meet the patentability requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112). A patent application is examined to determine its entitlement to a patent under the
law. Id. The requirements under the law are adequate disclosure (includes enablement), novelty,
nonobviousness, utility, and that the claimed invention fall within a class of statutory subject
126

matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101103, 112 (2000).
127 35 U.S.C. § 157(a)(1) (2000) (requiring that an SIR must provide an enabling disclosure); In
re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[E]ven if the claimed invention is disclosed in a
printed publication, that disclosure will not suffice as prior art if it was not enabling."); see also
Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 804 F.2d 659, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
128 PaperlessAccounting Inc., 804 F.2d at 665 (explaining that '[a] disclosure must be such as
will give possession of the invention to the person of ordinary skill").
129 Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 934.
130 See In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("A] disclosure lacking a
teaching of how to use a fully disclosed compound for a specific, substantial utility ... is, under the
present state of the law, entirely adequate to anticipate a claim to either the product or the process..
• .'1).

131

Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 2362.

132 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,

§ 2112.02, Process Claims, 2100-54 (Aug.

2001) [hereinafter MPEP] ("The discovery of a new use for an old structure based on unknown
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Additionally, a defensive publication must be accessible to the public qualify as
prior art. 133 Exact determination of whether a reference was "available" is a legal
determination approached on a case-by-case basis. 134 So long as the reference is
135
available to the public interested in the art, it will be "accessible."
With the above basic legal framework in place, this comment proceeds to discuss
positions in which a disclosure strategy could be utilized. The availability and
applicability of defensive publication will vary on an individual basis.
The
appropriate use of a disclosure strategy will depend significantly on various economic
factors, corporate goals and policies, and subjective decisions and judgments. This
dependency will prove to make most situations difficult to analyze, at best. An
analysis of the traditional positions assumed by competitors reveals apparent
opportunities to utilized defensive publishing, only to be severely limited by practical
realities. However, a narrow situation appears to lend itself more readily to a
combined use of patenting and defensive publication protection.

II.

OPPORTUNITIES TO UTILIZE STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE DEPEND ON THE PARTICIPANT'S
POSITION

A threshold inquiry for any competitor is "whether the invention presents a
persuasive business case that is worth the expense involved in patenting." 13 6 The
strategy adopted by a firm may help dictate its actions and the extent to which it
utilizes strategic disclosure. 13 7 A desire to achieve "freedom of action"13 8 sets the

properties of the structure might be patentable to the discoverer as a process of using."). However,
"[w]hen the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out a
claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process." Id.
133 Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("If
accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show that particular members of the public
actually received the information.").
134 In -reHall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
135 1d. "The proponent of the publication bar must show that prior to the critical date the
reference was sufficiently accessible, at least to the public interested in the art, so that such a one by
examining the reference could make the claimed invention without further research or
experimentation." Id. A survey of the technical aspects of "accessibility" is beyond the scope of this
comment. For further cases discussing the accessibility of a reference, see In re Donohue, 766 F.2d
531 (Fed. Cir. 1985), In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981), and In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357
(C.C.P.A. 1978).
136 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5.
137 August & Buchenhorner, supra note 13, at 267. It may be helpful to consider three common
licensing strategies: 1) freedom of action; 2) revenue source; and 3) exclusive market. Id. Freedom
of action is briefly discussed in the text of this comment. See supra Part II.
The revenue source strategy is a situation in which the participant will seek royalties as
compensation for research and development costs. August & Buchenhorner, supra note 13, at 268.
Patents are pursued for their licensing value to companies that perform little of their own research
and development. Id. Thus, the pursuit of patents in this situation is usually emphasized on
products where infringement is easy to prove. Id.
Under the exclusive market strategy, patents are pursued to gain control of an area of
technology. Id. Licenses will not be granted to others, and thus the patents will cover key aspects of
an invention and potential alternatives in an attempt to ensure exclusivity. Id.
138 Id. at 135.
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stage for strategic disclosure. 139 With this approach, a firm seeks to achieve freedom
140
to participate in a market without the constraints imposed by competitors' patents.
This freedom can be achieved not only by obtaining patents, but by preventing
competitors from obtaining patents. 141 This basic goal stems from the operation of
the American patent system, and plays an underlying role in intellectual property
protection regardless of a firm's position.
Part 11(A) discusses a model of the American patent system as a starting point.
Part II(B) then approaches the opportunities presented by strategic disclosure. In
Part II(B)(i), the position of a laggard in a patent race is discussed, while in Part
II(B)(2), the analysis turns to the leader of a patent race and the greater
opportunities available for effective use of strategic disclosure. Part 11(C) concludes
the analysis by discussing the implications of strategic disclosure and the practical
difficulties faced by using it as an alternative, rather than a complement to patent
protection.

A.

The American PatentSystem Model Guides the Analysis of StrategicDisclosure

The American 142 patent system has been characterized as a race model by
economists and theorists. 143 Under the race model, the winner in a patent race (i.e.
144
the first to invent) will gain the market advantage, while the loser gains nothing.
A participant's sole option is to try to win the patent race. 145 However, this model is
146
inaccurate because it fails to recognize the possibility of strategic disclosure.
Trying to win a patent race is not the only strategy available. 147 The optimal
148
strategy for a participant is to maximize its expected gains under a patent system.
No participant can reasonably assume it will win every patent race. Therefore, a
participant should not attempt to win every patent race, rather, it should anticipate

131) Cf Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at n.2 ("Preemptive publication may also be useful to
firms--whether in a race or not--that do not wish to incur the considerable cost of obtaining a patent,
but want to retain free access to their R&D.").
140 See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5 ("Just by publishing, he says, 'the company achieves
freedom of action for itself while stopping others from patenting."') (quoting John Cronin, CEO of
ipCapital Group).
141 Id.

142 This comment focuses solely on implications under the American patent system.
11 Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 926.
144 Id. at 926. "Second-place finishers, of course, do not leave the race empty-handed-they
surely enjoy some educational benefits from the process of competing, they have the possibility of
pursuing spin-off research, and so on." Lichtman, supra note 27, at n.58.
145 Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 926 ("While the sports analogy has provided a useful
framework for understanding the economics of invention, it has obfuscated an important aspect of

the inventive process: the possibility of strategic publication of research findings in order to prevent
the issuance of a patent to a competitor.").
146 See id. at 926-27 ("[I]t has obfuscated an important aspect of the inventive process: the
possibility of strategic publication of research findings in order to prevent the issuance of a patent to
a competitor.").

147 Id. at 927.
148 Id. at 931.
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and maximize a market position it assumes without patent protection in situations
149
where winning the race is unlikely.
The best strategy may be to prevent competitors from winning the patent
race. 150 By disclosing research information, a participant trailing in a patent race
("laggard") may be able to create prior art and preempt the issuance of a patent to a
leading competitor ("leader").151 This strategy recognizes a laggard's position and the
option to "publish or perish." 152 However, as discussed below, numerous practical
complications arise when attempting to use defensive publishing in this way. A more
successful way to utilize defensive publishing is available to a leader, especially one
who has already achieved a major invention and is developing improvements upon it.

B. The Relative PositionsofLaggards and Leaders
A participant's probability of winning a patent race hinges on its ability to
successfully complete an invention before its competitors. 153 As a basic "leader"
premise, a participant generally should compete till the end of the patent race if it
believes it has the highest chance of winning. 15 4 However, as will be proposed, even
this simple premise is subject to achieving greater gains by the inclusion of strategic
155
disclosure in a manner compatible with obtaining a patent.
In contrast, the general strategy for a participant with a lower chance of
winning a patent race may be to protect its own advances by limiting a competitor's
available patent protection.1 56 Rather than conceding a loss in light of an imminent
reduction to practice by a competitor, a laggard should employ strategic disclosure
and publish the information it holds in an attempt to limit the available patent
protection. 157 However, this general laggard strategy is also subject to difficulties
arising from the legal rules and practicalities of disclosure.
14) Id. "Consequently, in many cases the best strategy for firms is not to try to win every
patent race they enter, but, rather, to quit the race and maximize their profits without patent
prosecution." Id.
150 [d. at 927.
151 Id.
This is an attractive option to the laggard because any success will allow it to act freely
upon its own research results without fear of limitation by a patent granted to the leader. Id. at
932-36.
152 Id. at 927. The idea of "publish or perish" recognizes the situation firms facing a loss in a
patent race sometimes encounter. Id. The "perish" option exists because losing a patent race to a
competitor may result in a substantial loss of revenue for the laggard. Td. The "publish" option
avoids this result by preventing a competitor from gaining a patent, assuming the defensive
publication is sufficient to preempt, or at least narrow the scope of, a competitor's patent
application. -d.
153 Id. at 932. It is actually the first participant to achieve conception of an invention, rather
than actual reduction to practice, that will win the patent race, when accompanied with proper
diligence. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
15 Id. at 932.
155 See infra Part 111(B).
156 See Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 932 ("[A] firm estimating that it will lose should
attempt to maximize its expected profits in the absence of patent protection ... a firm in possession
of sufficient research results can bar its competitor from obtaining the patent by publishing the
information it holds.").
157 Id. at 932.
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1. Strategic Disclosure by Laggards
Strategic disclosure can benefit a laggard in some situations, but the legal rules
make it difficult and often undesirable. 158 The driving idea behind a typical laggard's
strategic disclosure is the following: publication will allow a participant to play a
"spoiler" role by raising a patentability bar and preempting a competitor's patent
application. 159 Strategic disclosure is attractive to a laggard because "to whatever
extent the strategy is successful, the laggard will be free to make use of any research
results it had in common with its rival, competing in some subset market based on
the products and services no longer eligible for patenting." 160 One easily recognizable
downfall does exist: the disclosure will limit the laggard's own ability to obtain a
patent as well.161
In further analyzing the strategy options available to a laggard, a "conventional
laggard" must be distinguished from a "legal laggard." 162 A conventional laggard
trails its competitor in the research and development portions of the patent race, but
can still overtake the competitor and win the patent. 163 In contrast, the legal laggard
cannot overtake a competitor because the rival has the legal priority of an earlier
conception date. 164 Thus, a trailing participant is a conventional laggard until a
rival's conception, and then becomes a legal laggard from that point forward. 165

a. The ConventionalLaggard
A participant in the position of a conventional laggard has the most options for
use of strategic disclosure. 166 A disclosure at this point could raise a section 102(b)
statutory bar if it describes the leader's future invention. 167 Alternatively, a
disclosure may render the leader's invention obvious under section 103.168 Thus, the
spoiler role is available to the laggard at this point. However, drawbacks and
potentially negative consequences suggest that disclosure in this situation may not
169
be the best choice.
A formal modeling of the conventional laggard scenario presents serious doubts
as to whether strategic disclosure is actually attractive at this stage. 170 The gains by
Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2190.
Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 934.
160 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2197.
101 Id. A secondary cost may be associated with the laggard's disclosures also. Td. Depending
on the specific situation, the disclosures may help other firms pursue related research. Id.
1 2 Id.
158

159

1603Id.

1

Id.

105 Diligence, as required, in pursuing a reduction to practice is assumed from this point
forward. Soe generally supranote 88.
166

Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2197. At this point in the patent race, neither the participant

nor its rivals has achieved conception. See id.

Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2197; see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
109 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2198; Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 2360-61.
170 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2190. Lichtman's game theory model addresses the
incentives a laggard faces when participating in a patent race. Id. at 2190-97. The formal
107
168
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such disclosure would block the competitor's patent and achieve freedom of action in
the relevant market."' However, the conventional laggard has not yet lost the
patent race, or rather the race to conception. 7 2 The conventional laggard could still
surpass the leader and obtain the patent. 7 3 At this point, the chance at receiving a
patent and market monopoly may be more valuable than a guaranteed freedom to
17 4
participate in the market at a much less valuable position.
Other problems arise in the scheme of the conventional laggard. Disclosure may
invite additional competitors, thus further reducing the value of the free
participation in the relevant market. 7 5 Additionally, disclosure of information that
76
is new to the leading firm may actually help accelerate their research.
Alternatively, the disclosure could potentially help the leading firm draft a patent
application distinguishing itself from the disclosure. 7 Such a disclosure would be
78
especially helpful in drafting claim language that clearly avoided the publication.
Another problem arises if the disclosure contains incomplete or inadequate
research results. 7 9 Such a disclosure may help establish that a later invention was
nonobvious. 18 0 Courts turn to secondary factors, such as success where others have
failed, as evidence in determining nonobviousness.' 8'
A laggard can thus risk
helping a leader prove patentability when it publishes results short of a successful
invention. 182
modeling is beyond the scope of this paper, but its conclusions address the heart of the
dilemma laggards encounter. The following brief summary of Lichtman's modeling is
necessary to understanding the direction it takes and conclusions it reaches.
Each
participant is unsure of its competitor's progress, and thus the model proceeds as one of
incomplete information. Id. at 2190. The model focuses on disclosures by trailing firms.
Id. at 2191. Ultimately, the greater the chance that a laggard can leapfrog the leader and
win the patent, the less appealing strategic disclosure will be. Id. at 2196. Similarly, a
diminishing payoff in the subset market will lead to a lesser attraction of strategic
disclosure. Id. at 2191. A third variable will have the same effect - the greater the change
in expected patent value from a disclosure, the more attractive strategic disclosure
becomes. Id. at 2193. This is because the destroyed patent value does not impose a cost on
the laggard, but rather a benefit. Id. at 2197.
171 Id. at 2198.
172 By definition, a conventional laggard exists prior to conception. Td. Upon conception, the
conventional laggard is termed a legal laggard, and the options for strategic disclosure change. Id.
at 2197.
173 Id.
at 2198.
"7 Id. ("[A] small chance at a big payoff would be worth more to the laggard than a guaranteed
opportunity for a small to modest payoff.").
175 Id.
16
177

Eisenberg, supranote 65, at 2361.
Id.

178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.

"The strictness of this standard by its terms varies from one field to the next and
changes over time, depending both on the scope and content of the prior art and on the prevailing
level of skill among people working in the field." Id.
181 Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that
"[o]bjective evidence of nonobviousness, when present, must always be considered before reaching a
legal conclusion under § 103").
182 Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 2361 ("Although the publication adds to the prior art, its
limitations also help document that the ultimate solution to the research problem was far from
obvious.").
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. The Legal Laggard
A legal laggard faces a situation quite different in contrast to that of the
conventional laggard.18 3 Disclosure at this point has minimal drawback.18 4 The
leader has already obtained priority because it was the first to conceive.18 5 Even if
the laggard is the first to achieve a reduction to practice, the leader will still have the
priority date.18 6 Unfortunately, strategic disclosure at this point is quite difficult to
achieve.
Because section 102(b) grants the leader a grace period of one year, the effective
use of strategic disclosure to affect patentability will be almost impossible, and only
occur after a one year delay.18 7 In a similar fashion, Rule 131 gives the leading firm
one year from the time of the laggard's disclosure before section 102 will bar a patent
application.188 For one year, the leader is free to file a patent application, essentially
rendering the laggard's strategy ineffective.18 9 Furthermore, the laggard's disclosure
may help prove nonobviousness under the secondary factors as previously discussed
under the conventional laggard's strategy.190
191
At the very least, uncertainty exists in assuming the spoiler role as a laggard.
The situations where disclosure will succeed in preempting a competitor's patent are
limited at best, and difficult to effectively exploit. 192 The idea of conception is so
uncertain at times that a participant may have trouble identifying itself as a
193
conventional or legal laggard.
This inherent uncertainty dictates that strategic disclosure opportunities will be
difficult to identify and utilize from the laggard's position. 194 In contrast, strategic
disclosure presents itself as a more promising option for leaders.

183 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2198.
184 Id. However, this point does not hold the same when dealing with a foreign first-to-file
system without a grace period. In such a situation, the publication will bar a subsequent patent
application.
185 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... before such
person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.").
186

Jcd.

187 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
188 37 C.F.R § 1.131 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000).
189 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2199.
190Id.
191 Id.

192 As noted in the background section of this comment laggards do have the ability to disclose
quietly. Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also supra Part
11(B). Using this tactic makes disclosures legally public, but obscure enough that rivals will have
trouble finding them. Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2184. However, to be confident that a disclosure
will protect the laggard in this manner requires that the Patent Office find it. Property Values,
supra note 2, at 10.
193 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2199.
194 Id.
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2. Strategic Disclosure by Leaders
A leading participant in a patent race may find it advantageous to employ
strategic disclosure. In the leader's situation, disclosure can protect his advantage in
195
the patent race.
A leader competing with a legal laggard has no reason to employ strategic
disclosure when viewed as an alternative to patent protection. 196 Once the leader has
achieved conception, the priority accorded under the American patent system will
insure the leader's right to obtaining a patent.1 97 Thus, the leader only has to focus
on being diligent in its pursuit of reduction to practice. 198 This comment will return
to this situation in the proposal, which suggests a different approach when strategic
1 99
disclosure is viewed as a complement to patent protection.
A leader competing with a conventional laggard faces a different situation and
should consider employing strategic disclosure.200 Disclosure by a leader in this
situation can force laggards out of the race. 20 1 Publication may serve as an indicator
to competitors (i.e. laggards) that the leader is far ahead in the race, and the laggards
would be better served by dropping from the race.202 Additionally, disclosure can
lessen the expected value of a patent to a point where a laggard's incentive to
continue ceases. 20 3 In either case, disclosure decreases the chance of a laggard

195 See id. at 2215 (noting several situations in which a leader's disclosure may drive the
laggard from the race).
196 Id. at 2204.
197 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
198 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2204.
199 See sup-raPart 111(B).
200 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2204.
201 Id.
202 Lichtman's formal numeric example explicitly addresses this benefit.

Id. at 2207
09. The leader has an eighty percent chance of winning, and the laggard has a twenty
percent chance. Id. at 2207. However, the laggard doesn't know enough to correctly
estimate its chances, and believes them to be sixty percent, rather than the actual twenty
percent. Td. Thus, both participants are willing to remain in the race. Id. If the leader
discloses information, the laggard is better able to realistically estimate its chance of
winning the conception race. Id. at 2208. Assuming a minor inadvertent increase in the
laggard's ability to win due to the disclosure and a small decrease in the expected value of
the patent, the incentive to remain in the race is recalculated. Id. The laggard's better
information about its chances and the lower patent value will reduce the potential payoff to
the point that dropping from the race is a preferred position for the laggard. Id. at 22082209. The leader has a greater chance of winning, especially when the laggard drops from
the race. Id.
203 Id. at 2207. Lichtman addresses this benefit with another numeric example to
illustrate how the patent value may be diminished to the point where the laggard drops
from the race. Id. at 2205-07. The leader and the laggard each face the same cost to
continue a race to conception, but the leader has a sixty percent chance of winning, and the
laggard a forty percent chance.
Id. at 2205.
The leader has an expected payoff
significantly greater than the laggard's. Id. If the leader discloses information, the
expected value of the patent drops and the chance of winning gap is narrowed. Id. at 2206.
Upon recalculating each participant's expected payoff, the laggard's has dropped below the
cost to continue the race. Id. Thus the laggard will exit the race, and the leader is better
off. Id. at 2207. The leader's increased chance of winning will make up for the loss of
expected patent value in determining the expected payoff. Id.
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surpassing the leader. 20 4 With a laggard driven from a race, the danger of being
surpassed is lessened, allowing a leader to continue research at a more efficient
pace.

20 5

In a "double preemption twist," a leader can use disclosure as a tactic to defend
its own research results. 20 6 A leader can use the one year grace period of section
102(b) to its own advantage. 20 7 By publishing first, and then filing the patent
application within one year, the leader can preempt a laggard from assuming a
spoiler role. 20 8 However, this tactic may not be attractive because it forces the leader
20 9
to file within one year.
Other potential dangers exist when a leader employs strategic disclosure. A
disclosure may help a conventional laggard gain ground. 210 Similarly, a disclosure
may aid the laggard in developing an alternative invention that would be
patentable. 211 Additionally, it could serve as prior art and narrow the scope of a
patent eventually obtained by the leader. 212 Still, in the leader's situation, disclosure
can protect, and sometimes even strengthen, his advantage in the patent race, and
should be considered as a practical protection option.

e. Analysis of the Implications on the Viability ofStrategic Disclosureas an
Alternative to PatentProtection

It appears that strategic disclosure may be more effective when utilized by
leaders rather than laggards.2 13 A conventional laggard has little incentive to
disclose, 214 and a legal laggard's disclosure will have little, if any, effect. 215 At best it
216
will signal the start of the one-year grace period for the leader.
204
205

Id. at 2188.
Id.

at 2205.

The speed of research will be "determined more by the relative costs and

benefits of bringing the invention to market, and less by the fear of losing" the race to conception.
Id. However, the leader may have less motivation when the fear of losing is removed, thus slowing
the pace of development.
206 Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 950.
207 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
208 Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 950.
Contra Lichtman, supra note 27, at n.70 ("That
argument is in error if a leader were to disclose information in the way Parchomovsky suggests in
his piece, those disclosures would not preempt laggard disclosures, they would instead simply start
the clock on a one-year section 102(b) bar.").
209 Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 950.
210 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2205. Given the apparent uncertainty involved, a leader could
easily misjudge his standing relative to the laggard, and disclose too much information. See id. at
2216 ("[Strategic disclosure] assists rivals by giving them possibly valuable information about the
invention .... ). This risk arises because as discussed previously, a sufficient disclosure must meet
the enablement standards of the Patent Act. See supra text accompanying note 126. Thus, there
appears to be some minimum threshold of information that must be provided. Anything at, or in
excess of, this threshold may provide a laggard with an unexpected gain in knowledge, thus, closing
the gap between leader and laggard. Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2216.
211 Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2216.
212 Id. at 2205. Assuming the patent application is not filed within one year of the disclosure, it
will serve as prior art. Id. at 2186.
213 Id. at 2215.
214 The conventional laggard has not yet lost the race to conception, and the gains of freedom of
action may not outweigh the potential gains from a patent. Id. at 2198.
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In contrast, a leader may be able to use strategic disclosure to protect his
advantage from competitors. 21' Disclosure by a leader may drive competition from
the race under some circumstances. 218 But disclosure can benefit a leader in another
way if utilized in a role of supporting patent protection on core patents.

III. STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE CAN BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED TO PROTECT A LEADER'S
MINOR IMPROVEMENTS ON ITS CORE PATENTS

This part addresses the difficulties that arise under typical strategic disclosure,
and a different strategy that lends itself particularly well to a leader's situation.
Part 111(A) reviews the problems encountered when strategic disclosure is
incorporated into a traditional patent race as an alternative to patent protection.
Part III(B) proposes a view of strategic disclosure as a complement to patent
protection when a leader is competing with a legal laggard.

A. StrategicDisclosurePresentsMany Problems When IncorporatedInto The
TraditionalPatentRace
In light of the analysis from both a laggard's and leader's perspective, employing
2 19
strategic disclosure in the midst of a patent race is a complicated proposition.
Conventional laggards are still in a bona fide position to compete with the leader,
and may not have sufficient incentive to assume the spoiler role that initially appears
to be a viable option under strategic disclosure. 220 Legal laggards will have sufficient
incentive, but the legal rules greatly hinder their use of strategic disclosure due to
221
the preference for the first to conceive under the American patent system.
From a leader's perspective, strategic disclosure may help when competing
against a conventional laggard, but the leader only must pursue the invention
diligently when competing with a legal laggard. 222 However, if strategic disclosure is
utilized as a complement, rather than an alternative, to patent protection, it seems to
lend itself particularly well to this latter situation.

217

See supra notes 168-172 and accompanying text.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000); Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2199.
See Lichtman, supranote 27, at 2204-05.

218

Id. at 2204-09.

215
216

It must be noted that the possibility of private bargaining between a leader and laggard has
not been part of the analysis. Private negotiations could further complicate, as well as diminish the
use of strategic disclosure in its traditional role as an alternative to patenting. Id. at 2201. For an
in-depth discussion of the potential effects of private bargaining, see Lichtman, supra note 27, at
2201-04, 2213-16, which suggests that private negotiations might displace strategic disclosure
because an agreement would benefit both parties by preserving the surplus created by a patent. But
see Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 948-50 (suggesting that a leader will likely not bargain, even if
it runs the risk of being preempted, because it will have trouble ascertaining the credibility of
threats).
220 See Lichtman, supranote 27, at 2198.
221 Id.
219

222

Id. at 2204.

[2:398 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

B. StrategicDisclosure Can ProtectIncrementalInnovations on Core Patents When
Used as a Complement to PatentProtection
This proposal returns to the situation of a leader competing with a legal
laggard. 223 A leader has no reason to employ strategic disclosure when viewed as an
alternative to patenting, because he already has achieved priority. 224 In contrast,
when strategic disclosure is utilized as a complement to patenting in this situation, it
has the potential to grant sufficient protection without the costs of patenting.
The development of small improvements on core inventions presents a favorable
scenario for using strategic disclosure.2 2 5 Whether an invention is a major
development or merely a minor improvement should be a factor in deciding whether
to pursue patent protection.2 2 6 By publishing incremental innovations to core
patents, a firm can achieve the initial patent protection necessary to create a market
advantage, and then protect that advantage through publication without enduring
227
the costs of patenting small improvements.
Defensive publishing should primarily be undertaken to support and strengthen
patent protection, as it has historically been used.2 2 8 Of course, a major innovation
should be patented to reap the rewards generated by the new technology and the
instant market advantage created by a patent monopoly. But patenting every minor
innovation after that point may prove to be an excessive burden in light of the
considerable costs of prosecution compared with a minimal potential gain of patent
protection. Alternatively, an innovation may not be part of a company's core
229
business, and thus a cheaper and faster alternative to patenting is desirable.
For each major innovation, there is usually at least one improvement on it.230
By defensively publishing small, incremental innovations, a company can quickly
protect the innovations and preserve the value of a major, core patent.23 1 The major
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
See Lichtman, supra note 27, at 2204 ("Having conceived, such a firm need not worry about
trailing researchers; the patent system accords priority to the first party to conceive an invention...
223

224

.11).

225 See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5 ("This is a fast, cost-efficient way to amplify an existing
portfolio.") (quoting John Cronin, CEO of ipCapital Group).
226 Id. ('[T]hey must decide whether the invention presents a persuasive business case that's

worth the expense involved in patenting.").
227 Id. at 5.
228 Poynder, supra note 11, at 2.
22$9 For example, in the Spring of 2001, a telephone headset manufacturer, Platronics,
developed technology for reducing microphone noise. Now Economy, supra note 43. The company
couldn't use the innovation at that point, but didn't want to let a competitor patent the idea before
they had a chance to utilize the new technology. Id. Platronics defensively published the invention
on IP.com, and put it in the public domain. Id. Thus, they prevented other companies from
patenting the idea before Platronics could commercialize it. Id.
230 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5. "You can't come up with a major patent without coming up
with improvements at least once." Id. (quoting John Cronin, CEO of ipCapital Group).
2:31Id.
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invention will be protected under patent, while the subsequent publications will
protect the core patent by preventing others from patenting an improvement. In this
manner, intellectual property can be protected while reducing the substantial costs of
232
patent prosecution.
For larger companies, this type of strategy may be effective with a ratio of two to
five defensive publications for each major patent. 233 For smaller companies, the ratio
may be considerably higher. 234 This strategy is a cost-efficient approach to garnering
intellectual property protection because publication is cheaper and faster than
patenting. 235 A company can avoid the costs of pursuing patent protection while
maintaining a level of protection on the most important core patent, and freedom of
action on minor improvements.

CONCLUSION

Inventions and improvements thereon must be protected in order to maintain
the market advantage they create. This is necessary in order to realize the full value
of intellectual property. 236 The traditional manner of protecting intellectual property
237
has been to utilize a strategy of blanket-patenting.
To avoid the downfalls of blanket-patenting, companies are choosing to pursue
defensive publishing strategies. By publishing information about an invention, prior
art is created that may prevent competitors from obtaining a patent on it because it
is no longer novel. 238

By preventing competitors from acquiring patents, defensive

publishing offers protection similar to that of blanket-patenting, but at a much
239
cheaper cost.

Because no participant can expect to win every patent race, a better strategy
may be to prevent the competition from winning the race. 240

This strategy can be

effective in the situation of an incremental improvement on a major patent - the
improvement is not economically worth patenting, but still must be protected to
maintain freedom of action 241 and safeguard the core patent.
242
As a basic premise, a leader should compete until the end of the patent race,
but greater gains can be achieved by including strategic disclosure in a manner
supporting prior patent protection. Whether the invention for which a patent is
sought is a core invention important to a company's business, or merely a small
incremental improvement should play a role in the protection strategy taken. By

232 Defensive publishing can be utilized in conjunction with a core patent to prevent
competitors from patenting small improvements, thus preserving the value of the core patent.
Poynder, supranote 11, at 2.
233 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 5 (paraphrasing John Cronin).
234

Id.

235 Buxbaum, supranote 1, at 5 (quoting John Cronin).
236 Burns, supra note 4, at 1.
237 See generally,Poynder, supra note 11, at 1-2.
238 Id. at 1.
239 Id. at 2.
240 Soo Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 927, 932.
241 So supraPart III.
242 Parchomovsky, supranote 29, at 932.
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defensively publishing small, incremental innovations, a company can quickly protect
the innovations and preserve the value of the core patent. 243 Adopting this strategy
avoids the prohibitive costs of blanket-patenting, and maximizes the value of
intellectual property assets for companies both large and small.

243

See supra note 223 and accompanying text.

